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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1996 an agreement was made between a well-known beverage manufacturer, Super-Cola Taiwan, (SCT) and a small 
Australian electrical engineering company, Dag-Brücken ASRS Pty Ltd, (DB), to provide an automated storage and retrieval 
system (ASRS) facility as part of SCT’s production facilities in Asia. Recognising the potential of their innovative and 
technically advanced design, DB was awarded a State Premiers Export Award and was a finalist in that year’s National 
Export Awards. The case tracks the development and subsequent implementation of the SCT ASRS project, setting out to 
highlight how the lack of appropriate IT development processes contributed to the ultimate failure of the project and the 
subsequent winding up of DB only one year after being honoured with these prestigious awards. The case provides 
compelling evidence of the types of project management incompetency that, from the literature, appears to contribute to the 
high failure rate in IT projects. For confidentiality reasons, the names of the principal parties are changed, but the case 
covers actual events documented by one of the project team members as part of his postgraduate studies, providing an 
example of the special mode of evidence collection that Yin (1994) calls ‘participant-observation’.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Scope of Case Study 
For a comprehensive assessment of the DB failure it would 
be necessary to discuss all the business functionality of DB 
including marketing, administration (finance) and human 
resource management. It is intended to discuss these issues 
only where it can be seen to impact on information systems 
development. This case study will concentrate specifically 
on the IT component and is therefore not intended to 
provide definitive answers as to the reasons for the 
ultimate demise of DB. It concentrates on examining how 
the DB IT development processes, and the environment in 
which the processes were conducted, might have 
contributed to the ultimate failure of the project and to the 
eventual failure of the organization. 
  
1.2 Logistics Overview 
Australian warehouse storage and retrieval of product is 
still predominantly a manual or semi-automatic process 
employing a variety of materials handling equipment such 
as conveyors, elevators and fork lift trucks.  
 
The relatively low cost of land in Australia, compared to 
high density population centres in Asia, generally limits 
that country’s use of high rise storage facilities to special 
situations that might include hazardous storage conditions 
or where desired throughout cannot be maintained with a 
manual system.  
DB believed that a market could be developed in Asia 
providing high rise automated warehouse solutions at more 
competitive prices than that demanded by the major 
suppliers, using a variation to the normally used ASRS 
configuration that involved automated ASRS robots 
(cranes) that were able to drive around corners.  
 
Globally, most high rise warehouses use ASRS cranes that 
are only capable of travelling in a straight line (referred to 
as straight-aisle cranes). The limitation of a straight aisle 
crane is that one crane is required to service each storage 
aisle in a warehouse. As cranes are a major part of the cost 
of this type of warehouse solution, by reducing the 
numbers of cranes there are significant savings. It is 
theoretically possible for a single aisle-changing crane to 
service a whole multi-aisled warehouse. 
 
1.3 DB ASRS Background 
DB had a history of providing electrical control systems 
using programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for a number 
of process control applications. The entrepreneurial DB 
managing director (MD) was an electrical engineer who 
had developed knowledge of PLC software and believed 
that the development of PC control software to be used 
with this new type of ASRS held few technical challenges. 
 
By 1996, the MD had secured a number of orders for their 
innovative and competitively priced aisle changing ASRS 
system. In addition to SCT in Taiwan the contracts 
included a milk supplier in Thailand, and a beverage 
manufacturer and two archival warehouse facilities in 
Singapore. Contracts had specified that the completion 
dates were to be within 12 months. 
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1.4 DB Project Scope 
In order to successfully market the innovative DB aisle 
changing cranes it was believed necessary to offer a 
complete warehouse management solution to clients. The 
various components included all materials handling 
equipment, storage racking, crane control software and a 
PC based control system.  
 
The SCT ASRS was designed to automatically move 
pallets of beverages from the end of multiple production 
lines for storage into a high rise warehouse; and when 
required for sale, to automatically move them to locations 
where they could be accessed for manual distribution. In 
what was a profound and accurate interpretation of the 
system it was philosophically described by one individual 
as “Emptying full holes that need to be empty and filling 
empty holes that need to be full”, (Kedge 1996) 
 
1.5 DB Project Rationale 
For SCT a high-rise ASRS solution was selected because 
in order to minimise stock outs the amount of inventory 
required could not be stored in a traditional warehouse 
configuration with the amount of surface area available for 
that purpose.  Although expensive off-site storage was 
being used as a temporary measure this had resulted in an 
unacceptably high level of ‘out-of-date’ stock by not 
adequately allowing a first in first out (FIFO) stock usage 
policy. With no personnel actually working inside the 
storage facility itself, the storage and retrieval system was 
designed to identify all pallets being stored, to optimise 
their storage locations and to retrieve the pallets in a FIFO 
pattern.  
 
1.6 Equipment Used 
The ASRS used two, twin fork, double sided, double reach 
cranes in a 5 aisle, 16 row warehouse configuration. The 
warehouse layout consisted of long aisles of up to 40 
horizontal pallet locations and short aisles of up to 12 
horizontal positions all of up to 10 pallets high (Figure 1). 
 
With their multiple reach configuration each crane was 
capable in any long aisle, of reaching up to 8 pallet 
locations at any one static position i.e. each set of forks to 
the right, single deep and double deep, and to the left, 
single deep and double deep, (Figure 2). The vertical range 
of 10 pallets high effectively allowed any crane to access 
80 pallet positions from any static horizontal location. The 
principal advantage of the DB system was of course that 
the cranes could travel around corners and could access 
any pallet position of any aisle. 
 
1.7 IT Components 
Because the system was automatic, all ‘jobs’ which, in 
their simplest form were merely movements from a 
specific pallet pick up point to a specific pallet delivery 
point, were required to be scheduled without manual 
intervention of any type.  To operate fully ‘automatically’ 
it was necessary to embed a great deal of functionality 
within a number of the control software modules.  At an 
early stage in the software design process the following 
functional modules were identified as being required for 
the system to run successfully:  
 
 Figure 1: ASRS Racking Layout 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Multiple reach positions of each ASRS crane 
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• A graphical user interface (GUI) displaying the status 
of the cranes and storage status. 
• A database to store information of storage and 
transactions. 
• A “product mover” (PM) application to determine 
optimum storage and movements. 
• A “traffic controller” (TC) application used to select 
routes, job priorities and crane separation. 
• A communication package transferring data between 
PLC and PC. 
• PLC programming of each crane. 
Requirements for each functional module are covered in 
more detail in the IT specifications section.  
 
1.8 Operational Requirements 
The SCT ASRS was at the end of multiple production 
lines, that manufactured an assortment of beverages in 
P.E.T. bottles, tetrapak containers and aluminium cans and 
in-feed into the ASRS warehouse from the production lines 
took place on three levels. 
 
Level 1 used a palletiser to feed an automatic guided 
vehicle (AGV), (referred to as the shuttle car), filling 9 
double gravity roller locations, used exclusively for P.E.T. 
bottles. Level 2 used 2 third party supplied robots to 
palletise stock that were then fed by another AGV into 7 
double conveyor infeed locations used exclusively for 
tetrapak containers.  Level 3 used a single robot palletising 
for a single, double deep conveyor in-feed location used 
exclusively for canned products. Empty pallets were 
required at each palletiser for product to be packed onto. 
Outfeed production was dependent on external demands 
for stock and requirements for these movements more 
difficult to estimate. An hourly rate figure equivalent to the 
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number of pallets entering the ASRS was considered 
appropriate, i.e 50 in and 50 out. Outfeed locations were 
via 75 triple deep gravity roller locations situated in one of 
the long aisles. When any of the outfeed locations was 
emptied, sensors fitted to each crane were able to detect it 
and a job created to fill this empty hole that needed to be 
filled. The crane was required to perform an aisle scan 
every 30 minutes. 
 
Normal production line speeds demanded that to avoid 
hold ups the ASRS had to be capable of consistently 
performing all the tasks detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Performance Requirements for pallet 
movements 
Start
End
Rack
Job Type 
Pallets 
per 
Hour 
Pallet cycle 
time 
(minutes) 
Clear Level 1 prodn. 30 2 min 
Clear Level 2 prodn. 8 7.5 min 
Clear Level 3 prodn 12 5 min 
To Outfeed locations 50 1.2 min 
Scanning Outfeed aisle 2 30 min 
Empty pallet stacks (10) 5 12 min 
TOTAL PALLET 
MOVEMENTS 107 0.56 min 
 
2. THE PEOPLE 
The MD and principal owner of DB was the 
entrepreneurial force behind the organisation and 
responsible for the basic design of the mechanical and 
electrical components as well as the software design 
overview and the overall project concept. He was 
described by one qualified graduate electrical engineer 
working on the project as a ‘truly brilliant electrical 
engineering designer’, although he was never able to 
confirm whether the MD had ever actually graduated from 
his university studies.  The MD had excellent PLC 
programming skills, and had ‘dabbled’ with some Visual 
Basic code for which he had produced his own simple GUI 
presentation unlinked to a database which he had used as a 
sales aid.  
 
The General Manager (GM) with an extensive background 
in civil engineering project management had no IT project 
management experience. A further two project managers 
were employed for eventual on-site commissioning. One 
was a qualified mechanical engineer with extensive 
experience with mobile cranes who acted as the 
mechanical engineering manager in the production stage. 
The other had no formal management qualifications but 
was experienced in contract management and had an 
understanding of small projects. Somewhat surprisingly, 
nobody on the management team had any experience of the 
type of IT development that was being attempted. 
 
There was at the commencement of the development a 
tactical decision taken to segregate the required software 
components into an IT based area, subsequently referred to 
as the ‘PC’ team and an electrical engineering based area 
that developed the ‘PLC’ software.  The PC team was 
responsible for developing software components which 
included the GUI, database, communications package, 
traffic controller and product mover, and the PLC group 
provided code to operate the functions of the material 
handling equipment through electrical motors and sensors.  
To reinforce the distinctiveness of the two groups they 
were physically located in separate offices 40 metres apart, 
within the industrial complex that was being leased by DB.  
 
Prior to appointing anyone in the PC team, a management 
decision had been taken to use a Windows NT based 
operating system with a Visual FoxPro development 
package for the GUI and database and C++ for integration 
with the PLC code via the ‘traffic control’ module.   
 
The PC team was initially staffed with only two systems 
analyst/programmers (SA/P), who were appointed at the 
same time. Only one SA/P had any commercial 
development experience having successfully operated his 
privately owned IT inventory management business for 10 
years, although his development experience had been in a 
UNIX environment with character based Foxbase+ 
application. Although his extensive background in 
inventory and warehouse management systems and formal 
qualifications in business management provided a business 
perspective for the project he had no experience of 
integrating technically advanced hardware communication 
features into software applications. His primary role was to 
design a GUI, PM and database that could be used with the 
DB ASRS system. 
 
Figure 3: Crane Performance Contract Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
The other SA/P had recently completed an undergraduate 
software engineering degree and had experience in 
hardware communication systems with a 
telecommunications provider. His primary role was to 
design and write a communication system between the 
PLC and the PC and to design and write the TC module. 
 
The PLC software design was to be carried out by the MD 
himself, two recently graduated electrical engineers and a 
more senior PLC electrical engineering programmer. These 
then, were the people that were initially involved in the 
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early stages of the actual development (as distinct from the 
pre-planning) stage.  
 
3. THE CONTRACT 
 
The contracts established between DB and its four ASRS 
clients prior to the commencement of development all 
contained provisions for staged payments throughout the 
project life cycle. Payments were to be made at 
confirmation of completion of milestones, with the actual 
payment amounts roughly equivalent to DB’s proportional 
outlay for that stage. One of the stage payments for SCT 
was to be made at completion of the design and 
development of the control software that was to be used 
with the system.  
 
Other than the occasional reference to a ‘PC controlled 
GUI’ and some arbitrary PC performance specifications 
there was no contractual obligation to design and develop 
the software in any particular way. The open nature of the 
PC software contract specifications reflected the fact that 
neither contract party clearly understood what a critical 
role the software component would ultimately play. Clients 
had entered into these contracts without involving their 
own IT/IS departments in any negotiation and it was not 
until after all contracts were signed that the SA/Ps first met 
with clients to produce the initial software specification. 
These meetings were also the first instances of client IT/IS 
personnel having direct contact with DB, although they 
had already been briefed by their own management.  
 
The contracts contained required performance levels for 
the completed systems in terms of crane movements per 
hour and how these performance levels were to be 
measured, but the formula used was one used for 
measuring the cycle times of a straight aisle crane. Aisle 
changing performance, constituting the principal difference 
of the DB system was not included in the contract 
requirements. Though the system involved the use of two 
cranes designed to carry two pallets at once, contract 
specifications only included performance figures for the 
time to deliver a single pallet on a single crane to locations 
in the same aisle (Figure 3). 
 
DB were offering a system that had yet to be completely 
designed, other than in broad conceptual terms, yet clients 
had entered into contracts that had guaranteed almost 80% 
of the total price before DB were required to deliver any 
working system. Stage payments were all at verifiable 
stages of the design/production process yet actual 
performance requirements were restricted to performances 
of the crane that could only be measured in the final stages 
of the project. Performance requirements for the ‘working 
system’ were based on  single crane, single pallet, single 
aisle measurement formulae and did not take into account 
SCTs production line demands detailed in table 1. At an 
operational level there was evidence of ‘implied’ 
performance levels, with SCT erecting a prominent sign 
suggesting performance figures of 384 pallets/hour. The 
contract certainly did not offer this fictitious figure, yet this 
figure could have been calculated by extrapolating dual 
crane/fork figures from a single fork performance in a test 
environment. Yet, as poorly worded and constructed as it 
was, the contract still remained the principal source of 
reference for system design and performance matters. 
 
Strict adherence to the letter of the contract by DB 
provided little real opportunities for clients to amend their 
contract terms and conditions, clearly biased towards the 
vendor, without accepting large price variations. Compared 
to other types of ASRS the original contract price was very 
competitive, yet any variation, (however small), from the 
terms of the original contract was either rejected outright, 
or was priced at an exorbitant rate by DB.   
 
An example of a subsequent contract dispute related to the 
GUI produced by DB. Implicitly, SCT had assumed 
because the plant was in Taiwan, and the warehouse staff 
spoke and read Mandarin, that the GUI labels would be 
supplied in Mandarin. It was not until the system was 
being tested on-site that SCT realised that the GUI had 
been produced only in English, with the contract simply 
not covering this issue. Although the non-Mandarin 
speaking system designer had in fact developed a method 
of producing multiple language versions of the GUI this 
multiple language version was ultimately not adopted 
because no agreement could be reached on who was 
responsible for the additional costs involved in rectifying 
this contract oversight.  
 
The absence of any operational performance requirements 
throughout the project life cycle resulted in not only the 
client being unable to evaluate progress but DB themselves 
having no real performance goals to work towards. 
Although a mature, experienced company may have been 
more successful in using a contract with this level of 
vagueness, by supplementing the contract terms with their 
own internal quality control procedures, DB had neither 
formal, nor informal quality control procedures in place.  
DB’s processes were typical of the Software Engineering 
Institutes (SEI), capability maturity model for software 
(CMM), ‘initial’ or ‘ad-hoc’ stage of development, (Paulk, 
Curtis, Chrissis and Weber 1993). There may have been a 
number of reasons why DB did not have a formal QA 
policy, but high on that list might have been that their 
clients did not demand it. As Oskarsson and Glass (1996) 
suggest, “ISO 9000 is a tool for customers buying software 
more than for developers building it”, (pxxi). 
 
4. THE IS/IT COMPONENTS 
Although DB was, as principal contractor, responsible for 
delivery of a complete working system, which included 
storage racking (supplied by a third party contractor) and 
the mechanical and electrical components of the system, 
this case study will confine itself to the various IS/IT 
components contained within the system.   
4.1 IT Environment 
The system operated through a Microsoft NT Server 
operating system using an IBM PC as the main server. 
Fitted to the cranes were PLCs that were controlled by 
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sensors and encoders, providing signals to electrical 
motors (eg hoist and horizontal travel motors). The PLCs 
also had two-way communication with the IBM Server, 
accepting commands from it (eg new job details), and 
providing confirmatory evidence of what it was actually 
doing (eg position of the crane or job completion). 
Communication between the static PC (through its COM1 
and COM2 ports) and the mobile PLC was conducted 
using power modems that worked through the main power 
supply feeds to the cranes.   
  
4.2 Software Modules: 
A graphical user interface (GUI) - A screen generated 
representation of the physical layout of the warehouse in 
both plan and elevation views showed the real-time 
positions of the cranes and their statuses and the storage 
status of each pallet location. Created in an application 
development system (VB4), the GUI also provided two 
way communications with the cranes, display and resetting 
of error states and an emergency stop feature. Within the 
GUI there were also stock maintenance features, 
transaction reporting features and visual displays of the 
locations of product types. Its real-time storage location 
display was achieved by linking with an on-line database. 
 
A product mover module (PM) - Embedded within the 
GUI were algorithms that created jobs for the cranes. In 
what was referred to as the ‘job hunter’ a continuous loop 
of database queries looked for full pallet positions that 
needed to be emptied, and empty pallet positions that 
needed to be filled. A job was initiated by the database 
query locating either a pick up point or a delivery point and 
the PM would, based on the attributes of either point, 
determine the other point to create a job. Various priorities 
were included within the algorithms that included:  
 
• First in first out recall (FIFO)  
• Last in first out recall (LIFO) 
• Part Pallet priority 
• Returned stock/mixed lot number priority 
• Production lot number priority 
• Fast moving stock priority and/or special storage 
• Optimum storage selections eg front/back matching 
and height preferences. 
• Quarantine status of stock 
 
Communication code, between the PC and PLCs -  
The communications module passed information between 
the traffic controller and the PLC on each crane but did not 
process any of the information. The TC and the 
communication module used a common DLL to pass 
information. The communication module would assemble 
the required messages for the PLC, which would be 
transmitted to the crane using a power line modem, 
connected to a single phase of the three-phase power to the 
crane as a dedicated communications line. 
A traffic control module - The traffic control (TC) 
module was written as a dynamic link libraries (DLL) 
function in C++, and activated through the GUI code. Its 
principal purpose was to optimize the jobs that had been 
scheduled from the ‘job-hunter’, while selecting the most 
appropriate forks (of either crane) to transport the pallet 
and to select the most appropriate route for the crane to 
take. The choices that it needed to make in real time were: 
 
• A priority sequence for jobs 
• Which crane should be used for each job 
• Which set of forks should be used for each job 
• The most appropriate route to take from pallet pick up 
point to delivery point. 
Crane use needed to be optimized by selecting jobs that 
would use both forks whenever possible, minimising 
situations where cranes were travelling with unallocated 
forks. An important additional function of the TC module 
was to retain separation of the cranes to avoid collisions. 
This function required the input of minimum safe distances 
between cranes varying according to which aisle the cranes 
were operating in.  
Materials handling control system (PLC code) -The 
purpose of the PLC code was to accept a series of 
instructions to move pallets, and to report the crane’s 
current status and alarms. The crane would accept a list of 
up to 10 movement instructions, a single instruction could 
be to pick up a pallet at a given coordinate, or to deliver a 
pallet at a given coordinate, or to move to a specified 
position. It was up to the crane to verify the coordinates, 
and to know how to move to them. If the destination was 
more than one aisle change away, the traffic controller had 
to include instructions for the intermediate path (so the 
path was not ambiguous). 
 
The PLC code was written in a version of BASIC, with 
enhancements for running multiple threads. Each motor on 
the crane ran in a dedicated thread - the long travel motors, 
the hoist and the forks. Other functions on the crane also 
ran in their own thread, including the module for decoding 
the messages from the traffic controller, and encoder 
accumulation. 
 
An On-line Database - A Microsoft Access relational 
database was used to store real-time storage location 
details and a transaction history of movements.   
 
5. THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
5.1 Designing in House 
Although Thomsett (1989, p.24) suggests that “Project 
Planning is a team-driven process; all team members 
should be active in planning their project”, certain strategic 
directions and tactical decisions had already been taken by 
DB management prior to employing any specialist IT 
personnel. The choice of a Windows NT environment on 
PC servers and workstations together with Visual C++ and 
Visual FoxPro application development systems had been 
already included in each client contract. The ability of IT 
developers to redefine the application environment and its 
component parts was therefore somewhat restricted.  
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5.2 GUI/Database 
Client requirements for the GUI/database had been 
provided to both SA/Ps on a visit to Taiwan shortly after 
they had joined DB. These requirements together with DB 
management general overview briefings, was the full 
extent of the formal specifications for the design.  
 
After approximately six weeks of initial design work using 
the Visual FoxPro application system, it was obvious to the 
SA/P working exclusively on it, that there were some 
serious technical limitations in using this combination of 
FoxPro combined database and front end with Visual C++. 
Although his background had been with FoxBase+/FoxPro 
and he had no professional experience with Visual Basic, 
the SA/P still advised management that they should 
reconsider the use of FoxPro in favour of VB with a 
separate database of either Microsoft Access or SQL.  It 
was agreed to change the application development tool to 
VB and after further analysis, management decided to 
adopt MS Access as the database back end in preference to 
SQL.   
 
Fortunately the original design of the GUI/database 
provided a high level of ‘portability’, described by Meyer 
(1997, p11) as, “… the ease of transferring software 
products to various hardware and software environments”  
and the change of application tool was carried out with 
relative ease.  Although a formal inspection process did not 
exist, the SA/P demonstrated each milestone he reached to 
anyone in the organisation he thought might be interested. 
It was however becoming increasingly obvious to the SA/P 
that, without the communication module, his own work 
was essentially only of cosmetic value.  
 
5.3 Communication Module 
It was clearly evident after three months that development 
of the communication module and initial design of the 
traffic control module was proving to be more difficult 
than originally anticipated. The SA/P developing these 
modules had failed to deliver even an initial prototype for 
the communication module. As nobody at DB, (including 
his fellow SA/P), understood what he was doing the SA/P 
was unable to get internal help and unlike his fellow SA/P 
had not developed his own informal network of experts 
that he could call on for assistance. The SA/P being 
extremely introverted did not communicate readily with his 
colleagues, keeping to himself while working feverishly 
producing copious lines of code, the value of which only 
he understood. 
 
Because there was no formal inspection process in place 
and no way of interpreting what had been achieved, this 
stand alone type development relied on an ‘all or nothing’ 
tracking approach, commonly referred to as the ‘one 
hundred-zero’ approach. Either a finished product emerges 
at the end or it doesn’t. When ultimately a development 
ends up with 0% rather than 100% it is convenient to 
allocate blame on developers, yet a fundamental of modern 
quality assurance systems recognises managements 
ultimate responsibility for quality, (PMI 2000, p.97).  
 
Unable to assist his fellow SA/P technically, the GUI SA/P 
was also unable to convince management that the total 
absence of any deliverable should be urgently addressed. 
His warnings were misconstrued by management as being 
simply a ‘clash of personalities’ between an extraverted 
developer and his introverted colleague, so management 
decided to bring in a third to oversee interaction between 
the SA/Ps.  
 
5.4 The External Consultant 
Management decided to engage the services of a part time 
external consultant to oversee the work being carried out 
by the two developers.  When it was obvious to everyone 
that the development was not proceeding normally, the 
reality of software engineering as being more than just 
programming, (Ho-Stuart, Moraji and Thomas, 2000), was 
still not clear to DB management. This misunderstanding 
led DB management to select a university lecturer in 
electrical engineering with little commercial IT 
development experience, rather than an IT professional, to 
oversee the project.  
 
His first task was to perform a walk-through of the two 
developers' code and his first report to management 
indicated that there was indeed a serious problem. The 
problem that he identified was however not in the 
communication module at all, but in the GUI/database 
module. Although also not understanding what the 
communication module code was attempting to do, his 
remarks on how well the communication module code 
looked e.g. indented correctly, well documented with 
proper naming conventions, contrasted with his scathing 
attack to DB management on how the coding appeared in 
the GUI/database module.   
 
His advice was that the communication module was 
proceeding normally but that the GUI/database needed to 
be totally rewritten using proper naming conventions, code 
indenting and more documentation. He also became 
directly involved in redesigning the GUI, requiring 
features that had neither been discussed nor requested by 
clients, but which he felt would enhance the GUI’s ‘look 
and feel’.   
 
The GUI SA/P complied with the consultant’s instructions, 
as the explicitly stated alternative was his dismissal. 
However by focussing on what might be construed as 
‘cosmetic’ items or internal quality factors, Meyer (1997), 
it deflected interest away from the practical consideration 
of non-delivery of any part of a communication module.  
 
5.5 The Test Rig/PLC 
In the early stages of the project DB had constructed at 
considerable cost a scaled down ASRS test site complete 
with racking and a single crane. The rationale for 
constructing this test facility was for both testing 
components and to show clients a prototype of the 
equipment that they had contracted for, because as yet, no 
such operational system existed.  
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It was used predominantly to test mechanical, electrical 
and PLC software features associated with the cranes. DB 
management appeared more at ease with the type of testing 
where something physical could be seen to be happening, 
e.g. cranes moved, forks extended and retracted, cradles 
lifted and importantly the crane drove around corners, 
rather other types of testing more commonly associated 
with software developments.  
 
Because there was ever only one crane on the test rig the 
functionality of the TC module was limited to selections of 
route rather than its ability to cope with multiple cranes, 
maintaining separation or selecting the most appropriate 
crane for a particular job. Therefore most of the traffic 
control module features could never be physically tested 
on the test rig. Although this was a limitation of the test 
facility it did offer the opportunity to produce prototypes of 
all the other software modules.  
 
A GUI was constructed representing the test rig racking 
layout, linking each storage location to a database in the 
same manner in which the operational version at SCT was 
designed to operate. Yet, the PLC testing was however 
almost exclusively conducted directly from the PLC code 
itself and not from the GUI via the communication 
module. Each module was essentially being produced 
separately by different groups of developers representing a 
development methodology that could best be described as 
a series of stand alone waterfall approaches, (Sommerville 
1995).  
 
This type of ‘bottom-up’ approach requires each of the 
components to be at an advanced level of completion 
before any serious attempt at integrating individual 
components can take place. If any of the development 
teams are unable to complete their individual components, 
use of such a monolithic approach, not only prevents 
integration testing from occurring, but those teams that 
have completed their own individual tasks are held up from 
further testing their own work. When for example the 
GUI/database (as a stand alone component) was in an 
advanced state of completion, the communication module 
had not progressed beyond an initial development stage. It 
was impossible therefore to pass messages from the GUI 
interface on the PC to the cranes PLC.  The effectiveness 
of the test rig was therefore severely limited by the absence 
of one small but nevertheless critical component.  
 
5.6 Integration 
The initial decision to segregate the PC and PLC teams 
was an indication that DB management believed the 
functionality of each role was totally different, whereas in 
reality both groups were developing software components.  
The separation was overtly reinforced by segregating the 
teams in different offices and covertly reinforced by 
naming the PLC team as the ‘A-Team’.  Although this 
naming was done to motivate the team that the MD himself 
had decided to lead, it failed to acknowledge the 
demotivating effect on members who weren’t part of his 
‘A-Team’.   
 
It was eventually realised that all these individual parts 
were not automatically integrable and that in fact some 
major functionality was missing altogether. The absence of 
any integrated development plan, which might have 
resulted in an understanding of the need for a more 
appropriate software development methodology, such as 
evolutionary prototyping, limited the development options 
to more monolithic models such as the waterfall approach. 
Reliance on the completion of substantial portions of 
individual modules before any integration could begin, 
presented both significant technical and strategic risks, 
(Australian Computer Society Inc 2000).  However, as no 
formal risk assessment was ever undertaken these risks 
were never explicitly acknowledged nor addressed by 
management.       
 
Even when it was clear to DB management that the 
development was not proceeding normally, it still believed 
belief that software development was little more than 
programming, and that by increasing the amount of 
programming effort, solutions would eventuate. Its obvious 
next step was simply to employ additional programmers, 
which they did, in the form of more inexperienced 
graduate programmers. It is unclear, when subsequently 
faced with further evidence that the strategy of “throwing 
more programmers at the problem” was still not achieving 
results, why alternative development strategies were still 
not considered.  
 
The ASRS building in Taiwan had been after some months 
delay, (not caused by DB), completed and the cranes 
themselves had been assembled within the storage racking. 
At this stage the client expected the software components 
to be added to the system so that operational testing of the 
cranes could begin. Although there was at yet no effective 
communication module, and only a rudimentary traffic 
control module it was believed that on-site commissioning 
must commence to comply with the terms of the contract. 
 
5.7 Project management 
The project manager chosen was the contract management 
specialist who had already been on-site for some months, 
supervising the construction of the building and erection of 
the cranes. In correspondence with the developers in 
Australia it was evident that he understood little of the 
nature and importance of the software components and he 
was unaware just how little of the software had actually 
been completed. His project plan indicated that using two 
PLC developers and one SA/P, commissioning 
(commencing in August 1997) would be completed in 
three weeks. However, after five weeks of frantic 
development only a simple screen display of the position 
of one of the cranes was achieved, indicating that a basic 
communication link had finally been established. At this 
point there was no operational TC module, which meant 
that multiple cranes could not safely operate together. On 
site development work in Taiwan was in fact to continue 
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with a team of up to six people up to the official plant 
opening on April 1st 1998 and beyond.  
 
Although it appeared superficially that there was a 
separation of responsibility between managerial and 
technical control in the project, (Thomsett 1989), the 
reality was that nobody was adequately performing either 
function in the development process. 
• Managerial, as the organisation had undergone a rapid 
expansion process with little infrastructure to support 
the expansion. The absence of a detailed risk assessment 
together with unrealistic scheduling, and a failure to 
prioritise indicated a deficiency in management control 
of the development process. 
• Technically, as the projects were prototypes that 
demanded a high degree of research and development 
style work. The absence of functional specifications, 
data models, design charts, module specifications and 
test plans indicated a deficiency in the technical control 
of the development process. 
 
5.8 Testing 
On-site commissioning was supposed to represent only the 
installation, testing, tuning and user training phases 
appropriate to the software development yet the 
commissioning phase became merely an extension of the 
research and development that was still being undertaken 
in Australia.  
  
While one SA/P remained in Australia working on the 
communication and TC modules the other SA/P was on-
site, installing and testing those parts of the GUI that did 
not require any communication link and populating the 
database with the warehouses specific storage data. The 
PLC engineers could not properly test their code as the 
crane’s electrical hardware had yet to be completed.  
 
No formal test plans were designed throughout the 
development project although individual developers, when 
time permitted, did attempt to test their own work. There 
was little static testing by any third party source and hence 
reviews, walk-throughs and inspections were either self 
generated by the developers themselves or not carried out. 
The academic appointed to oversee the software 
development part of the project undertook some initial 
static testing but appeared to make all seven of the 
common problems associated with software reviews that 
Weigers (1998) refers to: 
 
1. Participants don’t understand the review process. 
2. Reviewers critique the producer, not the product. 
3. Reviews are not planned. 
4. Review meetings drift into problem solving. 
5. Reviewers aren’t prepared. 
6. The wrong people participate. 
7. Reviewers focus on style, not substance. 
 
The level of test plan employed by DB could be best 
indicated by relating the example of the original on-site 
project manager being requested by the MD one evening to 
construct a test plan for the engineers to carry out. 
Awaiting the engineers the following morning was their 
test plan, a hand written document that said, in bold 
letters… “TEST CRANE 1 then TEST CRANE 2.” No 
further test plans were ever requested from that project 
manager.  
 
The nature of the development process prevented most 
integration testing until the latter stages of the project. 
Even when DB’s testing uncovered considerable faults and 
in some cases completely missing functionality, little 
attempt was made to modify the development plan and 
little immediate formal action taken to correct software 
related deficiencies.  It was generally left up to the 
developers themselves to modify their code and to add 
additional features when necessary. This led to situations 
where on-site developers were working up to 108 hours per 
week and regular 16 hours per day for weeks at a time.  
When one crane was operational and was being controlled 
by the GUI it was possible to finally perform a simple 
stopwatch test in the manner that was detailed in the 
contract terms.  It appeared that the crane could meet the 
contract specifications for required straight aisle 
performance.  However, the opportunity was taken to also 
test the performance of the crane in a more realistic 
operational test, picking up double pallets from one aisle 
and delivering them both to another aisle. The required 
pallet movements (table 1) for each fork was therefore (2 x 
2 x 33.6 seconds) or approximately 2 mins 14  seconds per 
crane with 100% efficiency of two crane utilisation. The 
average recorded time for a single crane pick up and 
delivery of two pallets was 2 minutes and 12 seconds.  
This indicated that only with close to 100% crane 
utilisation efficiency, would the cranes be capable of 
reaching SCT’s operational requirements.   
 
Because on site developers were working such 
extraordinary long hours there was little time left for static 
product analysis involving the regular analysis of source 
code that they had written. The GUI had included 38 
different PLC crane errors such as: 
 
• Front Fork Encoder 
• Long Travel Vector Drive 
• Failed Delivery Location Full 
• General PLC Run  
When the cranes were operating, capturing and recording 
these crane errors provided an opportunity to undertake 
dynamic product analysis by automatically collecting 
information about the systems own performance, with no 
additional user effort. By plotting the daily log of 
summaries of errors it provided DB with a guide to how 
long the system would take to stabilise while also 
identifying problems as they occurred and provided a 
method of prioritising remedial action.   
 
This dynamic testing had been undertaken by the on-site 
SA/P for his own analysis purposes. When the client 
became aware of this method of testing they too were 
keenly interested in the results and what they represented. 
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An example of the, by that time, strained relationship 
between the management of DB and SCT and the degree 
of trust exhibited by the parties, manifested itself in DB’s 
refusal to provide this data to the client without a formally 
documented request, which ultimately took another three 
weeks.  
 
When one crane went into any error state both cranes 
immediately stopped operating, the rationale being that if 
one crane was for some reason unable to operate, the other 
crane might not know where it was and a collision might 
occur.  The GUI would display what fault had occurred 
and it was then necessary to reset all errors from the GUI 
before either crane would restart. Some (critical) faults also 
needed to be investigated and rectified by physical entry 
into the warehouse. The average time for resetting faults 
was 3 minutes.   
 
Over a one month period of pre-production testing the 
level of overall critical and non-critical errors did not 
significantly drop, with the total amount of errors 
averaging over 200 per day, roughly equivalent to 6 hours 
of ‘downtime’ per production day. An algorithmic model 
predicting when the system would stabilise was unable to 
compute a date. DB’s immediate reaction was to stop 
producing the daily report.   
 
5.9 Development Performance 
The relative simplicity of the GUI/database components 
and the ease at which the product mover had been 
integrated into the code might have confirmed DB’s 
misconception of the level of complexity of the other 
software components 
 
The language used in the PLC coding was itself not that 
sophisticated or difficult to work with. The individual 
functions likewise were not that difficult, but the 
combination of all of the individual components made this 
software component very awkward to develop. The lack of 
overall functional specifications, design documents, test 
plans or formal documentation forced developers to adopt 
an ad-hoc approach in which there was a reliance on 
reactive rather than pro-active responses for fixing 
problems, as they occurred.  The combination of the use of 
the selected types of PLC and motors presented problems 
that were special to this environment and made the nature 
of the development more R & D rather than process 
oriented. The graduate developers working in this area had 
never worked with this simple type of software, having 
studied more sophisticated application systems such as 
C++ and Java at university.   
 
The communication module was the key component in 
integrating the most basic commands between PC and 
PLC. Throughout the project the communication module, 
as a result of the design of the physical communication 
layout, continued to produce ‘noise’ which sometimes 
resulted in phantom calls to and from the PLC.  
 
Although the communication module could be considered 
a key component for basic operations, the TC module was 
critical for performance purposes. Development of the TC 
was key to the success of this type of ASRS where 
multiple cranes can operate in the same physical space. 
None of the developers ever admitted the complexity of the 
tasks that they were being asked to perform or their 
inability to deliver what was required. Subsequent 
investigation of the complexity involved in the 
requirements for the TC module was undertaken by 
separately asking the opinion of two senior software 
engineers, both with PhDs in Computer Science and one 
with a specialisation in robotics. Although both believed it 
‘might be possible, given enough time’ they agreed that a 
fully optimised version would almost certainly be outside 
the capabilities of undergraduates or graduates with limited 
experience.   
 
The versions that were being provided for use at SCT were 
however far from being optimised. Early versions of the 
DLL were considered successful if they didn’t crash the 
system yet permitted both cranes to operate concurrently. 
But at the time of the official plant opening the TC version 
in use was such that a single crane operating alone could 
deliver more jobs than both cranes operating together.  
Attempting to use both cranes in the same general area 
would result in both cranes spending more time getting out 
of each others way rather than picking up and delivering 
pallets. Operators realised this and would send one crane to 
a remote part of the warehouse, disable it and allow the 
remaining crane to work on its own.  
 
5.10 Negotiation  
The obvious vagueness in the contract terms created a 
plethora of potential conflicts needing resolution 
throughout the project yet the absence of formal processes 
for enabling specification changes and handling conflict 
resolutions made the tasks of individuals working on site 
arduous to say the least.  
 
The generally held Western belief that a contract was 
legally binding contrasted sharply with the more usual 
Asian interpretation that contracts were more of a ‘starting 
point for negotiation’.  The intransigence of DB on some 
issues thus appeared to SCT simply as uncooperative and 
recalcitrant behaviour.    
 
This interpretation was reinforced by the original project 
manager adopting, what was described by client 
representatives and sub contractors alike as “a dictatorial 
attitude exhibiting an abrupt and uncompromising 
communication and negotiating style”.  His relationships in 
the various construction phases had predominantly been 
with local manual labourers and tradesmen; the autocratic 
style he had adopted he believed to be most appropriate for 
that situation.  Yet when he was joined on-site by 
professionally qualified, self motivated and technically 
aware DB staff he failed to modify his leadership style.  
His almost total lack of understanding of the technical 
aspects of the IT development, ignorance of IT project 
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management methodologies coupled with an already 
fragile client relationship, limited his contribution to the 
post construction phase of the project. It was not altogether 
surprising when another project manager was appointed to 
complete the more technical final phase of the project.   
 
5.11 Leadership 
Understanding both his weakness as a team member/leader 
and his poor overall management skills, the MD had 
appointed a general manager who had both excellent 
project management skills and general management 
abilities, to take a hands-on role managing the business. 
Yet, even though the MD was not even physically located 
in the same complex his influence over the rest of the 
organisation was still pervasive. The MD was an ‘ideas 
man’ who could develop concepts in his own mind but had 
difficulty in passing these ideas on to others. He had little 
need himself, for formal processes or methodologies as his 
own work was both innovative and multifarious. The MD 
also appeared to have had difficulty in coming to terms 
with the concept of ‘separation of responsibility’ and his 
role as ‘business owner’ often clashed with his role as 
‘technical director’. Whereas it is of course possible to 
have the same individual perform more than one role this 
duality was misunderstood by many staff, suppliers and 
clients alike and importantly misinterpreted by the MD 
himself.   
 
5.12 Organizational Structure & Design  
The layout of the work environment at DB’s head office 
was itself worthy of mention. The workshop area was 
separated into offices housing teams working on their 
various functional tasks. Informal discussions, in work 
breaks, among employees working in different functional 
areas, effectively ceased when the groups were required to 
take separate breaks.   
 
The appointment of the part time academic in a contract 
role initiated a DB policy change away from employing 
most staff on a full time basis.  The hiring of part time 
contractors, working with full time employees but earning 
significantly higher hourly rates was undertaken 
principally because these contractors had other 
commitments that prevented them from working full time. 
Any negative effect from the disproportionate 
remunerations from this arrangement did not become 
apparent until the part time contractors were working and 
claiming the equivalent of full time hours, and 
subsequently greater than normal full time hours.  
Although full time staff were unable to claim overtime for 
any work performed in excess of their ‘normal’ 40 hour 
week, on-site they frequently worked well in excess of 
these hours. Their motivation for working such extended 
hours was obviously not financial, yet the presence of staff 
claiming large overtime payments was particularly 
frustrating to them. The development team(s) that had 
never worked together as a unified and synergistic unit had 
yet another reason to work heterogeneously.   
 
5.13 The Contractors 
The motivations of the ‘contractors’; as they were then 
described by the full time employees, was being 
questioned. It is still difficult to determine why full time 
staff under such extraordinary pressure, retained their 
motivation, perseverance and dedication to their tasks, yet 
even though everyone was failing, the contractor’s 
inability to succeed was given special derision. In what 
appeared to be a case of a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
(Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968), the perceived ‘lack of 
loyalty’ by the contractors ultimately manifested in a 
covert act that was to have severe implications for DB. 
Two DB contractors working together on another DB 
contract in Singapore were approached by that client to 
‘consult’ for a day, prior to returning to Australia. The 
contractors, as ‘independent’ consultants, and paid 
handsomely by the client for only an extra days work, 
provided the client with inside information about the 
project that possibly contributed to that client terminating 
their contract with DB a few days later. This clandestine 
meeting in early 1998 and the precise nature of the details 
in it was never made known to DB management, but the 
contract cancellation impacted on DB’s overall cash flow, 
credibility and possibly stakeholder confidence in 
successful completion of its other projects. 
 
5.14 The End is Nigh (Epilogue) 
Less than one week after DB had been awarded its export 
award it announced that ‘for administrative reasons’ it was 
to be placed in the hands of administrators. Approximately 
12 months after this took effect the company was wound 
up and its assets liquidated. The effect of this liquidation 
resulted in DB being unable to provide further assistance to 
SCT, as the result of which: 
 
• The SCT-ASRS was unable to perform at anywhere 
near the required operational speed. 
• The system was unreliable both mechanically and 
electrically. 
• The software components still required substantial 
modification, debugging and tuning and did not have 
the expected functionality. 
 
SCT eventually replaced the whole system with a more 
conventional straight aisle ASRS model. Although many 
ASRS systems have been successfully completed since, 
none have ever used the same technology as attempted by 
DB. As well as all DB employees losing their jobs, a 
number of client executives that were involved with the 
various ASRS projects were also dismissed. The 
administrators were ultimately only able to award DB 
creditors a few cents in the dollar, and legal action was 
undertaken against the administrators themselves.  
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
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The case study failure has hopefully provided some 
important lessons, and it is hoped that its messages might 
help prevent similar occurrences in other projects. 
 
This case study attempts to illustrate why modern IT 
project managers require a range of multi-disciplinary 
skill-sets in order to increase the likelihood of project 
success. It also illustrates how the absence of any one of 
those skill-sets might contribute towards project failure. 
Generic project management skills, acquired within one 
discipline, regardless of the general competence of the 
individual, may be neither sufficient nor appropriate for 
application within an alternative discipline.  
 
ACRONYMS 
ADS Application Development System  
AGV  Automatic Guided Vehicle  
ASRS  Automated Storage and Retrieval System 
CMM  Capability Maturity Model  
DB  Dag Brücken Pty Ltd  
DLL Dynamic Link Libraries 
GM  General Manager  
GUI  Graphical User Interface  
MD Managing Director 
MIS  Management Information Systems 
PIR  Post Implementation Review 
PLC  Programmable Logic Controller 
PM  Product Mover 
SA/P  Systems Analyst/Programmer 
SCT  Super Cola Taiwan 
TC  Traffic Controller 
VB Visual Basic 
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